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Abstract 
This paper examines the question of why so many ordinary Hutu participated in genocidal 
killing of Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994.  I find that mass mobilisation was contingent on the 
fulfilment of two main conditions.  Firstly it required a mindset – the internalisation of a set of 
historical and ideological beliefs – within the Hutu population.  These were predominantly 
beliefs in a historical Hutu oppression at the hands of Tutsi and in an ideological definition of 
the ongoing civil war as an ethnic one, a Tutsi attempt to reinstate this historical order. 
Secondly, it required the commitment of State institutions to the genocidal project.  This 
commitment provided the initial trigger, legitimacy and impunity for civilian participation in 
an anti-Tutsi programme.  However, once triggered the degeneration into genocidal violence 
was the product of a complex interaction of other motives ranging from coercion, 
opportunism, habituation, conformity, racism, and ideological indoctrination.   
 
 
At the time of writing, just over ten years have elapsed since the world stood by and 
witnessed a genocide unfold in Rwanda.  Since then new scholars from disparate fields of 
research have been drawn to Rwanda seeking explanations of this macabre phenomenon.  
With the passage of time their research has born competing hypotheses concerned in various 
hues with the perplexing questions of ‘How and why did this happen?’  Beyond the simple 
human tragedy of the violent nature of so much death, these questions are also driven by the 
terrible peculiarities of these killings.  The main agents of the Rwandan genocide were 
ordinary civilians, wielding crude instruments of death often against those they personally 
knew.  Moreover, this genocide was not confined to specific regions of Rwanda – massacres 
committed by a few – but took place on a national scale at a terrifying speed, and with the 
active participation of a sizeable part of the population.1  It was not possible for any Rwandan 
not to know what was taking place in his/her country.  This empirical paper presents part of 
the results of a research project whose primary objective is to examine exactly how Hutu 
farmers were mobilised into committing acts of genocidal violence against their Tutsi 
neighbours.2   
 
In summary, I argue that mass mobilisation, including collective violence, during the 
genocide was contingent on two main conditions, fulfilled in different ways in different parts 
of Rwanda.  Firstly, mobilisation required a mindset: the prior internalisation within the Hutu 
population of a particular set of historical-ideological beliefs.  The historical component, 
deeply rooted in Hutu collective memory, was of Hutu oppression at the hands of Tutsi that 
the Hutu Revolution had ended in 1959.  The ideological component defined an external 
                                                
1 The terms ‘active participation’ and ‘sizeable’ both require definitions that appear subsequently in this paper. 
2 This research is being conducted for a doctoral dissertation at the Development Studies Institute of the London 
School of Economics.  I am grateful to Drs. David Keen and Peter Uvin for supervising it as well as the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council for providing the funding for it.   
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threat, the ongoing war, in historical and ethnic/racial terms and rested on twin beliefs:3 one, a 
belief that the war was an ethnic/racial one, a collaboration between Tutsi outside the country 
(the enemy without) with Tutsi inside the country (the enemy within) against the indigenous 
Hutu majority; two, that military defeat would reverse ‘les acquis’ of 1959, and return the 
Hutu to a position of subordination and inferiority.  The second condition necessary for mass 
mobilisation was the commitment of state institutions, which still had authority and/or power 
in the eyes of the population, to the genocidal project.4  This commitment provided the trigger 
point for mobilisation, the initial legitimacy to the actions of the mobilisers and the mobilised, 
and the impunity necessary for these actions to rapidly and ultimately degenerate into 
genocidal violence.5  However, this subsequent degeneration was the result of a complex 
interaction of individual motives and not only the consequence of the State’s continuing 
authority and power.     
 
Scholarship on the genocide to date has tended to focus either on the role played by important 
individuals, elites acting within the key institutions of the State’s civilian and military 
apparatus, or on the context of specific structural forces, macro-political and macro-economic 
trends at play in Rwanda at the time, or on some combination of both.6  As a result, meso- and 
micro-level variations in the causal mechanisms behind the violence in Rwanda are not 
properly captured and the genocide is instead misleadingly conceived of as a homogenous, 
indivisible event.7  Grand theories of genocide based on research or evidence at this level 
cannot fully address the complex task of isolating those conditions that were conducive to 
genocide, and those conditions that were not.  In different parts of the country there were 
different routes to genocide.  There is also a paucity of research that examines the actions and 
beliefs of the principal instruments of the genocide, ordinary rural Hutu, and the specific local 
contexts in which they operated.  Through micro-level research in four communities (cells) 
and a meso-level survey in two prefectures in Rwanda conducted over 2002 and 2003, I 
undertook to investigate the causes of popular participation in the genocide by identifying the 
mechanisms through which ordinary Hutu farmers, the majority in-group, were mobilised 
against the minority Tutsi out-group ultimately into committing genocidal violence.    
 
                                                
3 By race I refer to the belief that the Tutsi were alien to Rwanda, originating outside of the country, and by 
ethnicity I refer to the belief that the Tutsi were Rwandan but formed a subgroup distinct to the Hutu. The former 
view was predominant during the first Republic of Rwanda (1959- 1973) and the latter predominant during the 
second Republic (1973-1994), and were reflected in the terms used in official documents from those periods (e.g. 
Les Rapports Annuels for each Prefecture).  However, as we shall see later, the divisionist media in the years 
leading up to the genocide revived the notion of ‘race’.   
4 I distinguish authority from simple power by defining it here as legitimate power.  For example in Rwanda I 
would prima facie consider a civilian burgomaster to have more authority than a military soldier and a military 
soldier to have more authority than an interahamwe militiaman, though all may be powerful.  
5 As I shall explain later, genocidal violence is only one and the final choice of action during this mobilisation.  
Other actions that took place on a massive scale as part of the evolution of violence included conducting night 
patrols, manning roadblocks, espying Tutsi, controlling Tutsi movements, looting Tutsi property, destroying and 
burning Tutsi homes, killing Tutsi men, raping Tutsi women, and killing Tutsi women and children.   
6  Excellent syntheses of the roles played by civilian and military elites and macro-economic and macro-political 
forces in the genocide can be found in G. Prunier, The Rwanda crisis, 1959-1994: history of a genocide, London: 
Hurst and Company, 1995; and A. L. Des Forges, Human Rights Watch (Organization), et al., “Leave none to 
tell the story”: genocide in Rwanda, New York and Paris: Human Rights Watch and International Federation of 
Human Rights, 1999.   
7 By ‘meso-level’ I am referring to prefectures and communes; and by ‘micro-level’, I am referring  to sectors 
and cells.  In 1991, at the time of the last census before the genocide, Rwanda was organised administratively 
into 11 prefectures, 145 communes, and 1490 sectors.  A sector, whose average mean population was 
approximately 4800 residents, was then subdivided into cells.  In the 20 sectors where I conducted the survey 
were a total of 87 cells ranging in size in from 174 to 2902 residents and whose mean population was 902.   
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As research sites I chose two cells from the North (Ruhengeri prefecture, Kinigi and Nkuli 
communes) and two from the South (Butare prefecture, Maraba and Shyanda communes) of 
Rwanda.8  In each ‘pair’ I selected one that had experienced a relatively high level of in situ 
killings and one that had experienced a relatively low level of in situ killings.9  My primary 
source of information was oral testimony, collected using semi-structured interviews and an 
enumerator-administered survey.10 The semi-structured individual and focused-group 
interviews captured a cross-section of each community comprising of Tutsi survivors, 
imprisoned Hutu perpetrators, bystanders, figures of state and social authority, and older 
residents with historical knowledge of the community.11  The broader survey in turn sampled 
prison inmates and free citizens not accused of genocide-related crimes,12 and who were all 
resident in those cells in April 1994.  In other words, it was an attempt to sample perpetrators 
and non-perpetrators from the same communities.  The second main source of information 
was the hill gacaca committees in each of these four cells, as well as the corresponding 
gacaca committees established in the prisons.13  As part of the record of the genocide, each 
gacaca committee at the cell-level established the overall population of the cell in April 1994, 
the number of those accused of genocide-related crimes, and the number of victims.  In other 
words, I knew who stood accused, what they were accused of doing, against whom they did 
this, and when and how they were said to have done this.14  Finally, I was able to access a 
limited amount of archival data for the chosen prefectures and communes, though much had 
been destroyed or lost during and after the genocide.15  These records consisted mainly of 
prefectural annual reports, commune monographies, correspondence between burgomasters of 
the communes and the Prefect, and birth, death, and marriage registers that included data on 
ethnicity.   
                                                
8 I have chosen to keep the names of the cells anonymous and refer to them only by the name of the commune in 
which they are located.  
9 I took as a measure of the level of violence the number of Tutsi who were resident and killed within the 
territory of those communities (that is in situ) as a proportion of the overall Tutsi population of the cell.  In the 
Maraba and Kinigi cells, these were 8.3% (7 out of 84) and 2.9% (1 out of 35) respectively.  In the Shyanda and 
Nkuli cells these were 56.9% (41 out of 72) and 77% (46 out of 60) respectively.   
10 The survey was conducted in Ruhengeri and Butare prefectures involving 296 respondents and was 
representative at the prefectural level.  The survey instrument was first translated into Kinyarwanda and then 
translated back into French by a different individual.  Questions in the interviews were asked in Kinyarwanda 
while the answers to open-ended questions were recorded in French. Altogether the questionnaire comprised 223 
questions of which 63 were open-ended.  The non-perpetrator stratum of the survey was conducted by 19 
Rwandan enumerators each of whom had previous knowledge of the communities they were working in and at a 
minimum who had completed secondary school education.   The enumerators were a mix of Hutu and Tutsi.  I 
also asked them to complete the survey questionnaires personally first to see whether there were any worrying 
biases in their backgrounds and attitudes.  I also interviewed them each individually.  The perpetrator stratum of 
the sample was conducted by myself with the aid of an interpreter, as a personal authorisation was required to 
access prison inmates.   
11 In total the project conducted 42 semi-structured and structured interviews of residents of the cells:  10 
respondents from the Maraba cell, 11 respondents from the Shyanda cell, 10 respondents from the Kinigi cell, 
and 11 respondents from the Nkuli cell.   
12 The prisoners interviewed include both those who had confessed and those who had not confessed but stood 
accused by others.  The hill residents were chosen randomly (where possible every one hundredth name) from 
the gacaca lists of the cell population as it existed in April 1994, while ensuring that they did not also figure on 
the gacaca list of the accused.   
13 In 2002 the Rwandan government instituted a pilot system of community-administered justice, based on a 
traditional dispute-resolution mechanism called gacaca, one of whose objectives was to try and convict members 
of those communities for genocide-related crimes.  Gacaca had also been instituted in the prisons prior to this 
and I used information from the prison gacaca to verify the information gathered from the hill gacaca.   
14 It should be borne in mind that at the time of my research the gacaca programme was still in its pilot phase 
and those accused had not yet been tried and convicted.   
15 Prefectural level archives existed in both Butare and Ruhengeri, but communal level data only existed for 
Nkuli.  Records for Kinigi, Maraba, and Shyanda had been lost or destroyed.   
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In this paper I reject two propositions: that popular participation was simply the product of a 
longstanding tradition of obedience to state authority;16 and that genocidal violence was the 
inevitable outcome of longstanding and overt Hutu racism or ethnic prejudice against Tutsi.17  
I argue that people did not kill simply because they were told to kill, nor did the Hutu kill the 
Tutsi simply because their hatred finally had an opportunity to express itself. The first part 
provides a brief description of the genocide in each of the four communities.  This is followed 
by an examination of the two central questions.  An appendix is included that summarises the 
most important findings in each of the four communities.   
 
 
Describing the genocide 
Maraba cell, Butare, southern Rwanda  
The genocide in the Maraba cell began thirteen days after Rwandan President Habyarimana’s 
plane was brought down on 6 April 1994.  Of the 84 Tutsi who were resident, only 26 were to 
survive.   The cell was close to the frontier with neighbouring Gikongoro prefecture where the 
killing had already started.  Tutsi fleeing these attacks passed through the Maraba cell seeking 
refuge at the nearby Simbi Parish, pursued by their assailants.   Initially the burgomaster and 
the conseiller appealed for calm and urged villagers not to join the attacks.18  Meanwhile, 
Tutsi from the sector joined their Gikongoro compatriots at the Parish having either been 
forced to flee under threat from looters or having fled out of fear.   Finally, the visit to Maraba 
of the newly-appointed pro-genocide President, Sindikubwabo, on 17 April, unleashed attacks 
on the 3000-5000 Tutsi who had gathered at the Parish; and with the removal to Butare of the 
Tutsi prefect opposed to the genocide, the burgomaster committed himself to the genocidal 
project that same evening by radio.  Two days later, attack groups were organised and 
roadblocks erected in the cell itself by longstanding racists, former soldiers, and MDR-Power 
leader E.R.19 Meeting almost every morning, the attack groups hunted down Tutsi who had 
either hidden or chosen to remain in their homes, looting homes in their wake.  Tutsi 
continued to be hunted and killed throughout May and June, though the majority had already 
been massacred at the local parish and health dispensary in April.  The groups continued their 
operations until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) arrived on 2 July.20   
                                                
16 For examples of the ‘obedience’ argument being advanced, see Prunier  (1995), p.248; H. Hintjens, 
‘Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 37:2 (1999), p.271; Philip 
Gourevitch, ‘After the Genocide’, The New Yorker, 18 December 1995, pp.84 & 93. For examples of the 
‘ancient, tribal hatreds’ explanation, see CNN broadcast, ‘Burundi and Rwanda sites of ethnic violence’, 7 April 
1994 (transcript obtainable through Lexis-Nexis); R. Dowden, ‘Rwanda’s Twins locked in eternal war’, The 
Independent, 10 April 1994; W. Schmidt, ‘Strife in Rwanda’, The New York Times, 10 April 1994. 
17 Given the space constraints of this chapter, I treat only two of the five questions that were under investigation 
in the project here.  The other three questions under investigation were:  To what extent did the advent of 
political parties in 1991 promote the ethnic division and consequent violent mobilisation along ethnic lines of 
the rural poor?  To what extent and through what mechanisms did the context of the ongoing civil war influence 
participation rates in the genocide?  To what extent was violence the product of poverty, that is a structural 
decline in socio-economic living conditions through the mechanisms of demographic pressure, land degradation, 
and land scarcity?   The answers to these questions appear in my forthcoming dissertation. 
18 As explained earlier Rwanda in 1994 was organized on four principal administrative levels.  In descending 
order of size these were: Prefectures headed by a Prefect, Communes headed by a Burgomaster, Sectors headed 
by Conseillers, and finally Cells headed by Responsables.  
19 The Mouvement Démocratique Républicaine (MDR) had strong roots in the ParmeHutu party credited with 
the Hutu Revolution of 1959, and enjoyed strong support in Gitarama prefecture and the northern communes of 
Butare prefecture.  It was split between a moderate and extremist wing, MDR-Power. 
20 The RPF’s army, comprised mainly of the descendants of Tutsi exiles from the 1959 Revolution, invaded from 
Uganda in October 1990.  It is also this army that put an end to the genocide.  
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Shyanda cell, Butare, southern Rwanda.   
The remotest of the cells, Shyanda, was also the last to descend into the genocide, some 
eighteen days after Habyarimana’s assassination.  Initially the sector conseiller and cell 
responsable, along with their constituents, were very concerned as to who was behind the 
looting and burning of homes they could see on the neighbouring hills.  It was not yet 
apparent that Tutsi were the targets.  This uncertainty impelled the sector conseiller to 
continue to organise night patrols and also establish roadblocks, activities in which both Hutu 
and Tutsi participated, to ensure the security of his sector against unwelcome intruders.  
Meanwhile burgomaster T.S. had been summoned to a meeting in Butare town with the new 
Prefect.  The substance of this meeting is unknown.  However, on 22 and 23 April, following 
his return, assistant burgomasters D. and I., along with veterinarian G., accompanied by 
villagers, conducted the first looting and burning raids on Tutsi homes in neighbouring 
sectors, during what were ostensibly night patrols..  The following morning they came to the 
centre of the sector in which the Shyanda cell was also located, and demanded the 
whereabouts of all the Tutsi.   Eyewitnesses report that they told the crowd they should not eat 
the cows until their work was done.  In response E.K., a local butcher, a well-known and 
longstanding Hutu extremist, immediately mobilised a group of men and went to search the 
Tutsi homes, but found them empty.  The Tutsi in fact had suspected something was afoot and 
had spent the night hiding in the sorghum fields.  The next day, however, a group gathered at 
7 a.m. at the local cabaret (bar), as E.K. had ordered, and several parties were organised and 
set out to hunt down the Tutsi where they were hiding.   Almost all the 41 Tutsi killed from 
the cell met their end that day.  The bodies were buried by villagers the following day.  
Having exterminated the Tutsi, no more attack groups were conducted in the cell, but 
villagers subsequently maintained night patrols and participated in groups that raided other 
areas.  This continued until the RPF arrived in July, when the surviving 11 Tutsi of the cell 
dared to return to their homes. 
 
 
Nkuli cell, Ruhengeri Prefecture, northern Rwanda 
The Nkuli cell boasted a population of 60 Tutsi, a sizeable minority (7.6%) for a community 
in Hutu-dominated Ruhengeri. Interethnic troubles began in the cell long before Habyarimana 
was killed.  The proximity to the war led to early suspicions that the Tutsi were acting as 
accomplices of the invading RPF army, and in 1992 two Tutsi men were arrested from the 
cell.  From that point the remaining Tutsi men began to flee, leaving their families behind as it 
was initially thought that only the educated men were being targeted as collaborators.  
However, in 1993, in reprisal for the RPF violation of the ceasefire, a family of seven Tutsi 
was burned alive in their home in the neighbouring cell R. by soldiers working together with 
villagers.  By this time the movements of the remaining Tutsi in the cell were extremely 
restricted by the vigilance of their suspicious Hutu neighbours.  On 7 April 1994, immediately 
after it was known that Habyarimana had been killed, the conseiller of the sector, aided by 
villagers, Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) extremists,21 and soldiers from 
the resident army camp, led a systematic campaign of attacks on all the Tutsi left in the cell.  
Unable to hide or flee, within two days the extermination was all but complete, with 88% of 
the Tutsi population killed.  Forty-six met their end within the cell, and seven in the adjoining 
military camp.   
 
                                                
21 La Coalition pour la Défense de la République, the CDR, was a political party that ran on an open anti-Tutsi 
platform and was often identified as the extremist arm of Habyarimana’s MRND party.   
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Kinigi cell, Ruhengeri Prefecture, northern Rwanda 
The seven Tutsi homes that were occupied at the beginning of the war were deserted by April 
1994, their 35 occupants having either fled or been killed in 1991.  Located on a frontline of 
the war, bordering the then Zaire, the villagers lived in a state of permanent insecurity, fleeing 
their homes twice following RPF incursions into the area.  The burgomaster of Kinigi 
commune, T.G., chose to exact revenge for the war on his Tutsi population.  In the cell this 
first led to the arrest in October 1990 of three members of a Tutsi family by villagers from a 
neighbouring sector, K., as part of a wave of 8000 arrests that had swept the country, 
following the FAR’s simulated attack on the capital.22  They were released a week later, 
having been beaten.  Several days following the RPF raid on the Ruhengeri prison, on 23 
January 1991, a group of villagers from the same K. sector came and killed the male head of 
that same family.  As in Nkuli, the movements of the Tutsi were closely monitored by the 
population.  In February 1991, FAR soldiers took and killed two more Tutsi men.  Shortly 
thereafter villagers from the same K. sector dealt the same fate to another Tutsi man.  The 
women and children who were remaining fled.  By July 1991 the cell was empty of Tutsi.  
When Habyarimana died on 6 April 1994 there were no Tutsi left to kill in the cell.  In any 
event, the cell was occupied the next day by the RPF who began their advance, causing the 
majority of the population of the cell to flee to Zaire.  
 
 
State Authority and the Legitimisation of Violence 
To what extent was participation in ibitero (attack groups) and other activities during the 
genocide, such as manning checkpoints and conducting irondo (night patrols), simply the 
result of villagers following the orders of state authorities?  At one extremity of this argument 
lies the belief that rural Rwandans, largely uneducated, had grown up in a culture of 
obedience, and thus responded unthinkingly to the call of the authorities to kill the Tutsi 
enemy: they killed because they were told to kill.23  At the other pole lie those who seek to 
credit the ‘masses’ with individual agency and autonomy in making strategic choices in their 
own interest: they killed because they wanted to kill.24  However, my research indicates that it 
was only once a commitment to genocide had been made by state authority figures who were 
still authoritative in the eyes of the population that mass mobilisation in an anti-Tutsi 
programme of action was triggered.  Until that point, the pro-genocide position had support 
only among a minority of extremists, and it was not yet a popular or predominant position.  
However, it was not enough for the State to simply give the order.  The massive response that 
was eventually seen additionally depended on the prior internalisation within the population 
of a particular set of historical and ideological beliefs. Also, although it was the above signal 
that triggered an anti-Tutsi programme, it was not the State’s authority that lay behind the 
programme’s subsequent degeneration into genocidal violence.  There were other forces at 
work here.  Thus popular participation was not simply the product of a longstanding Rwandan 
tradition of obedience to authority.   
 
I present the analysis behind these conclusions in three timeframes.  Firstly, I examine the 
relationship between the state authorities and the population in the war years leading up to the 
genocide.  Secondly, I look at what happened immediately after Habyarimana was killed on 6 
                                                
22 See Prunier (1995), p.109 for a description of this event in which the government pretended that the RPF had 
launched an attack on the capital, Kigali, to legitimise the wave of arrests that followed.    
23
 Prunier (1995), p.57; P. Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: 
stories from Rwanda, New York: Picador USA, Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1999, p.23. 
24 The strongest and best case for this explanation is J. P. Kimonyo, Revue Critique des interprétations du 
conflict rwandais, Vol.1, Butare: Université Nationale du Rwanda, Centre de gestion des conflits, 2000.   
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April 1994.  Finally, I consider the three months that followed, during which most of the 
killings took place in each community, until the RPF took control of most of the country.   
 
 
The Impact of War and Multi-partyism (1 October 1990 – 5 April 1994) 
In both Maraba and Shyanda, from the time that opposition political parties established 
themselves in 1991, there was an erosion in the authority and power of the Mouvement 
Révolutionnaire National pour le Development (MRND) at the local level in the South.  The 
vulnerability of the MRND was visible and felt at the cell level, but the situation of the 
burgomasters at the commune level was largely unknown, and their authority remained intact 
for the ordinary population.  In the Maraba cell the struggle was between the MDR, the most 
popular opposition party, and the MRND.  Eventually, with the eclipse of the moderate wing 
of the MDR at the national level, it was the extremist wing, MDR-Power under the leadership 
of a former soldier, E.R. that was to establish itself as the chief challenge to the authority of 
the MRND in the community.  The responsable of the Maraba cell found himself sidelined in 
the power struggle: 
I did not join any political party and I stopped going to the MRND meetings.  
There would be abuse hurled between the parties.  The PSD was full of young 
delinquent men (ibarara).  But the real problem was between E.R. who was in 
MDR-Power and his elder brother who was in the MRND.  There was tension and 
they exchanged bad words after meetings.25  
 
In the Shyanda cell, the responsable found himself in a similar predicament, though his 
position was being threatened not by an opposition party leader but by the local butcher,26 
well-known for his racism and feared for his skill with a machete, and whose extremism 
became increasingly vocal as the war progressed.  A genocide survivor reports how he would 
always pinch her nose whenever he saw her saying he could not wait for the day that he could 
shave it.27  Another villager remembered how the same butcher would come and sell banana 
beer directly in front of the cabaret (bar) that the responsable owned to show to everyone that 
he was more powerful than the responsable.   
 
In the North the situation was quite different. In both communities the MRND was 
predominant and the survey shows it enjoyed overwhelming grassroots support within 
Ruhengeri, among Hutu and even Tutsi initially. The popularity of the MRND was not 
surprising, as it was well known (and the survey corroborates this)28 that Ruhengeri, along 
with Gisenyi prefecture, had been favoured by Habyarimana as the region of his birth.  
Opposition was weak and parties were closely monitored and intimidated by the MRND.29  
Opposition party activists were labelled as accomplices (ibyitso) of the enemy RPF, and the 
survey shows they had few professed supporters.30  Instead it was the war that preoccupied 
                                                
25 Interview with former member of the cell commitee, Maraba cellule, Butare, Rwanda, April 2003 
26 E.K. was a supporter of the PSD party, the party dominant in this area, but was not a political leader.   
27 Long noses were a stereotyped characteristic of Tutsi. 
28 86% of all respondents thought that the northern prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi were favoured by 
President Habyarimana. 
29 In Nkuli’s commune records, I discovered a copy of an almost verbatim report of the proceedings of an MDR 
meeting in 1991 written by an MRND infiltrator and submitted to Ruhengeri’s Prefect, the most senior regional 
MRND representative. In addition an MDR office building had been destroyed and there was correspondence 
from the burgomaster denying his authorisation of this action.    
30 88% of the respondents in the North who admitted to supporting a political party stated that this party was the 
MRND.  The next most popular party was the MDR, scoring 10%.  
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the state authorities and distrust of the Tutsi ‘enemy within’ was deep.  The state authorities 
instituted anti-Tutsi campaigns in response.  In the Nkuli cell in 1993, soldiers aided by 
villagers burned a family of Tutsi alive in their home in reprisal for the RPF violation of a 
ceasefire.  Similarly, in Kinigi the burgomaster ordered the arrest of Tutsi following the RPF 
invasion in October 1990.  Then again, following the RPF attack on Ruhengeri prison in 
January 1991, the same Tutsi family was the target of an attack leaving the head of the 
household dead.  Ordinary villagers were co-opted into these campaigns from early on too.  It 
was villagers, albeit from a neighbouring sector, who arrested and brought three Tutsi to the 
commune for interrogation following the alleged RPF attack on the capital in 1990.  It was the 
same villagers who killed the first resident of the cell in the reprisal attack for the RPF raid on 
the Ruhengeri prison in 1991; and it was villagers in Kinigi and Nkuli who curtailed the 
movements of Tutsi in their cells, manned roadblocks, and conducted night patrols in the 
years before the genocide.  There was a commitment by the State to an anti-Tutsi position 
already in place, and it was a commitment that the population accepted and was complicit in.   
 
So we see quite clearly a sharp contrast in the years leading up to the genocide in the 
relationship between the population and the state authorities in these two regions.   Although 
the MRND was under pressure and unpopular in the South, the war was distant and the Tutsi 
threat appeared negligible.   In contrast in the North, the power and authority of the State went 
unchallenged, but the war provoked a strong anti-Tutsi backlash from the State and the 
population. As we shall see in the next section, these differences determined both the trigger 
point and the configuration of forces involved in the killings after Habyarimana was 
assassinated.  However, they did not affect the eventual outcome: a massive and popular 
effort to exterminate the Tutsi.  
 
 
Choosing Genocide (6 April 1994) 
Once the news of Habyarimana’s assassination on 6 April 1994 became known, two very 
different responses were seen in the North and the South.  In the Nkuli cell, killings began the 
following day, but in Maraba and Shyanda in the South the killing did not start for another 
two weeks.31  The difference lies in the moment of commitment of the meso-level (commune) 
authorities to anti-Tutsi violence.  In the North this occurred long before Habyarimana was 
killed, but in the South it did not occur until mid-April.  In addition, once the burgomasters 
had signalled their pro-genocide position, the violence was organised and led at the local level 
by different figures in the North and South.    It was the state conseiller in the Nkuli cell who 
gave the signal, while the state officials giving the signal were an extremist and a political 
opportunist in the Shyanda and Maraba cells respectively.  This reflects the regional 
difference in the authority and power of the state in the years leading up to the genocide.   
 
In the North, the commitment from the State to an anti-Tutsi position was in place before 
1994.  The constellation of forces was already perfectly aligned in the North.  The meso- and 
micro-level civilian authorities, the military authorities, the extremist politicians, militia, and 
the general population had all been complicit in anti-Tutsi activities from as early as 1991.  It 
was unsurprising, then, that on 7 April we saw in the Nkuli cell that the sector conseiller 
immediately took the lead, assisted by villagers, CDR supporters, militia, and soldiers from 
                                                
31 The killing in the Maraba cell began on 19 April and in the Shyanda cell on 24 April.  In the Kinigi cell there 
were no Tutsi remaining, having either been killed or having fled in 1991.  The day after Habyarimana died the 
RPF advanced from its position to occupy the Kinigi cell and the majority of the population fled.   
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the adjacent military camp, in attacks against the Tutsi in his area.   In other words, it was the 
same configuration as before.   
 
The chronology of events was different in the South.  With Habyarimana’s death, the situation 
became fluid and ambiguous, and the burgomasters found themselves at the centre of 
competing forces.  There was no precedent for killing Tutsis as there had been in the North. 
On the one hand, the Tutsi Prefect of Butare, Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, the most senior 
civilian authority in the region, remained opposed to the genocide.  On the other hand, the 
new central authorities in Kigali were calling for blood, as were extremist elements from 
within the commune and from neighbouring communes.  
 
In Maraba, burgomaster J.M.H. found himself in a dilemma over what to do with the several 
thousand Tutsi refugees gathered at the Simbi parish.  However, his mind was made up on 17 
April when the interim President, Sindikubwabo, visited Maraba, and the Butare Prefect was 
removed from office over the radio.  The massacre at the Parish immediately commenced, in 
which J.M.H. participated.  He had signalled his pro-genocide position.  Two days later, on 19 
April, the first ibitero (attack groups) were organised in the cell.  In Shyanda, burgomaster 
T.S. held out longer, but immediately after returning from a meeting in Butare town with the 
new Prefect, his assistant burgomasters led looting raids with the population.  Upon their 
arrival in the Shyanda cell on the morning of 24 April in a commune vehicle, the first ibitero 
were organised by the racist butcher, E.K.  Their arrival and address to the population sent the 
unequivocal signal of the Shyanda commune’s pro-genocide position.   
 
This reversal of position by the burgomasters effectively neutralised the power of the micro-
level authorities, the conseillers and responsables, to stop the killing in the southern 
communities.  Overtaken by events and wrong-footed by their superiors, they could now 
either join in the genocide or be left aside.  Their initial uncertainty and ignorance of the 
genocidal project resulted in their eclipse by their rivals from before: the racist in Shyanda, 
and the extremist/political opportunist in Maraba.  In the general instability and fear following 
Habyarimana’s death, the gap in authority and power at the micro-level was quickly filled by 
these two figures.  In any event, the authority of the conseillers and responsables had been 
waning in the years leading up to the genocide.  Unlike in the North, it was the non-state 
actors influential from before who organised and led the anti-Tutsi campaign.  One 
eyewitness, who became the responsable after the genocide, described this marginalisation of 
the micro-level authorities in the Shyanda cell: 
They [the responsable and the conseiller] did not stop the genocide because it was 
supported by the high authorities.  They were saying that the high authorities had 
more powers than them and that they would be killed too.  Once the responsable 
asked a group of people why they were going to kill and loot at a certain home.  
They responded that the leniency you have will sabotage our programme.  So he 
was afraid and was even told by the leader of this group that he was no longer the 
responsible.32 
 
Thus it was only once the higher, meso-level authorities signalled their pro-genocide position 
to the villagers that the population could be mobilised on a massive scale, rapidly climaxing 
in genocidal violence. It was clear from the interviews that ordinary villagers were oblivious 
to the vulnerability of the burgomasters and the pressures they had been under from Kigali, as 
well as pressure from political rivals and extremists within their communes.  The meso-level 
                                                
32 Interview, Shyanda, Rwanda, May 2003. 
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authority of the burgomasters was still intact in the population’s view.  The burgomasters’ 
eventual endorsement of the genocide consolidated the positions of the racist in Shyanda and 
extremist/political opportunist in Maraba, and legitimised them as the new authorities in their 
communities.  In these new roles they quickly embarked on the, by now, state-sanctioned 
programmes to eliminate the Tutsi that I shall describe in the next section.  Thus the defection 
of the burgomasters, and the rise of new authority figures at the micro-level were critical to 
mass mobilisation.  Until this point, there had been growing pressure from a minority of 
extremists within the commune to adopt the genocidal position, but there was not as yet a 
popular commitment to the project.33   
 
 
The Evolution of Violence (April – July 1994) 
I have tried to show that the State’s authority was necessary to trigger and popularly 
legitimise a programme of action that was to culminate in the elimination of the Tutsi.  In the 
Nkuli cell in the North, genocidal violence occurred immediately after Habyarimana was 
killed.  It took only two days to kill 46 Tutsi.  The speed of this response was due to the 
alliance of necessary forces already existing, having collaborated with impunity in an anti-
Tutsi campaign long before April 1994.  It was therefore not a large step to total elimination 
in this already-established campaign. 
 
The South presents a bigger puzzle.  There had been no earlier state-sanctioned anti-Tutsi 
programme of activity.  Once Habyrimana died, there was not an automatic move to violent 
elimination.   It was not until the moment that a representative of the State, whose authority 
was still intact in the eyes of the population, signalled a pro-genocide position that we see the 
start of an anti-Tutsi programme in the South.  This programme comprised a spectrum of 
increasingly anti-social activities that ended in genocidal violence.  In this section I argue that 
it was not the simple authority or brute power of the State alone that sustained and intensified 
popular participation in this programme.  In Maraba, for example, the population was engaged 
(without the intervention of figures of State authority) for three whole months in the hunt for 
Tutsi before the RPF arrived in July 1994.  The rapid degeneration to genocidal violence in 
the South was, instead, the result of the complex interaction of a number of dynamics.  
 
In the South, the population was progressively but rapidly co-opted into the new programme 
for action. There was a broad similarity between the two communities, showing a pattern of 
increasingly anti-social events.  First, Habyarimana’s death created fear and uncertainty.  
Extremists began a campaign of anti-Tutsi rhetoric.  Homes could be seen burning on 
neighbouring hills, but the cause was not yet known.  As a result, night patrols and roadblocks 
were organised, in which both Hutu and Tutsi participated, to ensure the security of the areas.  
Second, it became clear that the Tutsi were the targets.  Reports came in of anti-Tutsi violence 
in neighbouring communities.  The meso-level authorities signalled their defection to an anti-
Tutsi position in their own communities.  As a result, the looting of Tutsi property and 
destruction of Tutsi homes began.  Third, the micro-level authorities were eclipsed by the 
extremist in Shyanda and the political opportunist in Maraba, who mobilised and led part of 
the population in the first ibitero.  As a result, the killing began.  Tutsi men were initially 
                                                
33 Ideally one would have the counterfactual situation among the selected research sites to see whether mass 
mobilisation would not have occurred if a burgomaster continued to hold out and the extremists did not come to 
the fore.  However, it is my view that in such a situation a burgomaster would simply have been removed or 
killed, as the Prefect Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana had been, and replaced by someone willing to toe the genocidal 
line.   
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targeted, but the number of participants in ibitero quickly increased and the violence became 
genocidal.  Tutsi women and children were also killed.  Fourth, the ibitero multiplied,34 and 
moved to other communities.  They continued until the RPF arrived in July 1994.   
 
In summary, there were different routes to commitment to genocide in the North and the 
South.  In the North, the State’s authority at all levels was undisputed, as opposition parties 
were weak or non-existent and the MRND (the party synonymous with the State) was 
popular.  In response to the outbreak and the continuing proximate threat of the perceived 
‘Tutsi’ war, anti-Tutsi activities had been initiated from as early as 1991. All elements, 
namely the State institutions (civilian and military, meso- and micro-level), the non-state 
extremists, and the general population were already aligned in an anti-Tutsi constellation.  
When Habyarimana was assassinated in April 1994, the response was swift and unequivocal.  
In Nkuli, Tutsi began to be killed the following day; while in Kinigi there were already no 
Tutsi left: they had been eliminated or had fled since 1991.   
 
In contrast, in the South the war was distant, but the authority of the State had been under 
threat at the local level since the introduction of opposition political parties in 1991.  In 
Maraba, the sector conseiller was challenged by an MDR-Power leader, and in Shyanda the 
cell responsable was being undermined by a local racial extremist.  Once Habyarimana had 
been killed, the two commune burgomasters, under pressure from the new central command 
in Kigali and a minority of extremists from below, succumbed, and committed themselves, to 
an anti-Tutsi programme.  It was at that precise moment that violence erupted at the 
grassroots level.  However, unlike in the North, the violence in the South was organised and 
led at the local level by the two figures who had previously challenged the State’s authority.  
Once the burgomasters defected to the pro-genocide position, these two were able to establish 
themselves as the new legitimate authority figures at the local levels, completing the eclipse 
of the sector conseiller and cell responsable.  In this sense, state authority was necessary to 
legitimise the extremists’ position, and thereby their programme of action into which they co-
opted the population (with its particular mindset).  However, once triggered and legitimised, 
this anti-Tutsi programme of activity was sustained and intensified by forces independent of 
the state’s authority and power.  The violence had a momentum of its own to which the State 
continued to lend its influence.  In the absence of any State sanction for their increasingly 
anti-social actions, the mobilised population rapidly degenerated into genocidal violence.   
 
It is difficult to convey, let alone analyse, the villagers’ perceptions of events during these 
different stages in the degeneration towards genocidal violence.  Their own words best 
illustrate the diversity and contradictions in motives.  The first account is that of a confirmed 
non-participant in the genocide from the Maraba cell:35   
When villagers went to the places where the Tutsi fled to, they said they could not 
leave them alive there and take their things as they knew each other.  And the 
community had been sensitised that one group was the enemy and this gave them 
the energy to do what they did.  It was clear in the gacaca meetings that some 
people participated because of sensitisation and so most people killed to get rid of 
the enemy and those people who were being killed were the supporters of the 
enemy.  I would say that in general there was a personal liking of each other and it 
was the authorities who are to blame as they turned them against these people.  
                                                
34 In Shyanda the ibitero only lasted two days in the community but irondo continued and people participated in 
ibitero in other communities.   
35 This interviewee was a Vice-President of the gacaca committee for Maraba.  One of the qualifications for this 
position is that a person not be accused by the community of having participated in the genocide.   
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Some of the villagers were saying that because the authorities told them to do this 
they thought that they would not have to answer for anything.  But now people see 
it was wrong.  Now it is the villagers who are suffering and those in the prison 
who are in suffering while those who organised the genocide are in Arusha where 
they get television and complain of not having enough to eat. 
If they were going to attack a rich person, more people would join.  If they were 
going to attack a poor person, there would be less people.  For example in A.’s 
case, her father had many cows and so many people, more than 20, went.  There 
were no women in our cellule who did this.  In other parts of the country, there 
were women.  They would do something that matches their strength like uproot 
sweet potatoes but they would not kill.  Ibitero were everyday.  When they 
attacked a home, somebody would say that “so and so had cows” and they would 
plan to meet there.  In the first days people went by force to go and fight in the 
war (gutabara) and after that they went voluntarily because they could get 
property.36 
 
This observer’s account is rich in contradictory motives.  His initial account explains that 
Hutu reasoned that they had to kill the Tutsi if they wanted to keep their possessions.  In the 
same breath he ascribes the killing to the ideological messages that the Tutsi were the enemy.  
He goes on to say that people felt emboldened, and that they could act with impunity since the 
authorities did not stop them.  In his second account, he explains how initial coercion was 
quickly replaced by material incentives for participation.   Evidence from the broader survey 
supports the coercion argument to some extent.  In-group sanctions did exist, but they were 
overwhelmingly monetary: a cash fine or property looted.  Although many believed in the 
threat of physical harm, “putative duress”,37 there was not a single instance of anyone being 
killed for not participating or even for hiding or helping Tutsi.  His use of the Kinyarwanda 
word, gutabara (to go and fight a war, to go to save) also affords us a little insight into an 
ideological mindset of war.   
 
The next account is of a confessed killer from the Shyanda cell:   
The next house was G.’s.  There was no one in the house.  I was in this attack 
group.  I just came across these people and followed as I was coming back from a 
bar and was drunk. I did not go in earlier attack groups as I did not know what 
was happening.  The house was already looted.  They had taken everything.  I 
don’t know who did this.  As it was a tiled house it was not burned.  Instead they 
looked for the occupants of the house and killed them.  When they found them 
they killed 8 people including G.’s family.  5 members of his family were killed.  
The others were just hiding with them.  I stoned one of them but it was my 
neighbour who finished him.  There were many in the attack group—between 20 
and 30.  About 10 had pangas.  It was not all 10 who used their pangas – only 
about 4 did.  The others watched only and were shouting words corresponding 
with what they were doing.  The bodies were buried the next day.  We all 
participated in the burial.  We were over 100.  It was to prevent the dogs from 
eating them.38 
                                                
36 Interview with Vice-President of gacaca committee, Maraba commune, Butare, Rwanda, April 2003. 
37 This phrase is used by Browning to describe the fear of members of the German battalion responsible for the 
massacre of Polish civilians in World War II if they did not obey orders (C. R. Browning, Ordinary men: 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland, New York: HarperCollins, 1992).   
38 Interview with confessed prison inmate, Butare central prison, Rwanda, May 2003. 
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In his account, this perpetrator attempts to explain that his participation in this killing was 
accidental.  He did not plan to kill anyone as he only met the attack group on his way home.  
Also, the killing came as a surprise to him.  He did not know that there was a plan of attack 
against the Tutsi.  There is also evidence of group de-individuation, the absence of a sense of 
individual responsibility.  Everyone participated in this kill either as machete-wielders or as 
pro-active bystanders.  They all had a role to play, but no single person was responsible.  In 
addition, a clue to the extent of mass mobilisation for the genocide is given in the number, 
more than one hundred, of villagers who buried the bodies the following day.   
 
The following account is of a genocide survivor from the same cell as this perpetrator:   
When the President died on the 6th, it took a long time for such things to happen 
here in [Shyanda cellule].  On Friday April 24th, one of the boys coming from the 
market said that the President said all Tutsi should be killed.  The following day, 
Saturday, the conseiller told us not to flee and we even went out to dig in the 
fields.   That same day at 2 p.m. we saw houses burning and we saw it was only 
the Tutsi houses.  We did not sleep at home that night.  We slept on the hills.  
When I was hiding in the sorghum, I heard gunshots but later we heard that they 
were just making a noise so that people would come out to be killed.  In the 
morning we came back and then E.K. came and wanted to take the cows of my 
husband.  My husband refused and then he took the cows by force.  My husband’s 
brother gave E.K. one free cow and so he left him alone.  That was in the 
morning.  Then at around 3 pm that is when all my family members were killed 
except my husband who was killed 2 days later on Tuesday.  
I saw one attack group that killed my family members (my in-laws).  I was hiding 
in the house and I heard them being killed.  There were a lot of people.  I heard 
them drumming and whistling and after they had killed them they came in the 
house.  I had locked myself in one of the rooms with a child I was breast-feeding.  
The leader sent in 2 men and they took away my 2 children and when they 
reached outside, they undressed them to see whether they were boys or girls.  
They were arguing among themselves as to whether they should kill them.  My 
elder child was begging for forgiveness.  One of the men said let us leave them as 
they are only girls. I was not killed as I was Hutu married to a Tutsi.  They only 
started hunting the women when the Inkotanyi were approaching.  Then they said 
we should start killing all those married to Tutsi so that they cannot tell them what 
happened here.39  
 
This genocide survivor’s account illustrates the uncertainty in Tutsi minds, and the initial faith 
they placed in their sector conseiller after Habyarimana’s death.  It was not clear even to them 
that they were the targets.  As she is from the same cell as the perpetrator above, her 
testimony possibly corroborates his claim that he did not know that the Tutsi were being 
targeted until he joined an attack group.  The second account confirms that it was initially 
only Tutsi men and boy children who were being hunted in this community.  Women were 
not targeted, as ethnicity is patrilineal in Rwanda.  However, women became targets later on 
when Hutu feared reprisals from the approaching RPF.  The degeneration into genocidal 
violence, that is the total elimination of Tutsi, was complete.   
 
                                                
39 Interview with genocide survivor, Shyanda commune, Butare, Rwanda, May 2003. 
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From these abbreviated anecdotes of the micro-dynamics of the genocide in the South, a 
multiplicity of possible motives for popular participation in the various activities leading up to 
and including genocidal violence can be inferred.  It was clearly not simply because the 
authorities had told them to do so, but seems to have been a complex interaction of racism, 
ideological indoctrination, opportunism, habituation, conformity, and coercion.     
 
There are obvious difficulties in attempting to quantify the determinants of free will or in 
analysing human motivation generally.  Individuals may have several motives at once.  Their 
motives may change as their participation in the activity progresses.  They may remember 
their motive differently after the event.  Their conscious motivation may be different to their 
unconscious motivation. They may choose to represent their motivation differently to third 
parties.  The research techniques used in this project are too crude to find conclusive answers 
to such questions that really belong to a number of subfields of psychology.  These risks are 
highlighted by the different responses made to two questions. Respondents were asked why 
they personally participated in night patrols or manned roadblocks.  The most popular 
response was that it was the law or an obligation (itegeko) (obedience to authority, 57%).  The 
second most common answer was that they were fighting for their country or defending 
themselves against the enemy (ideological mindset of war, 33%).  The third most popular 
answer was that they or their loved ones were under physical threat if they did not participate 
(coercion, 20%).40   However, when asked why other people joined the attack groups, the 
responses were quite different.  The most popular answer was that these people stood to gain 
materially from the looting (opportunism, 40%).  The second most popular answer was either 
that they thought the Tutsi were the enemy, that they were fighting for their country or that 
they were defending themselves against the enemy (ideological mindset of war, 22%).  The 
third most popular answer was that it was simply the law or an obligation (obedience to 
authority, 19%).   In other words, there is a tendency to explain personal motivation in terms 
of having no choice.  However, the same individuals tend to explain other peoples’ 
motivation in terms of opportunism, that is a self-interested choice.  
 
 
From Chauvinism and Racism to History and Ideology 
Although the authority of the state was necessary to trigger and initially legitimise an anti-
Tutsi programme of action that very swiftly escalated into genocidal violence, once triggered 
there was a complex interaction of dynamics, independent of the State’s authority and power, 
laying behind the rapid increase in the number of ordinary participants in these activities, as 
well as the genocidal direction that these activities took.  A new and unstable norm, 
legitimising and in some cases institutionalising anti-Tutsi violence, was becoming rapidly 
established within these communities.  In this section I argue that there was a deeper 
historical-ideological basis, a set of beliefs internalised by Hutu in the North and South of the 
country.  This mindset was also a necessary pre-condition for mass mobilisation, and in part 
explains the speed with which such a norm could be assimilated.  Without it the commitment 
of the state to the genocidal project could not have been implemented.  The bulk of the 
population must also have been primed and ready to respond to the right signal from state 
authorities, even if subsequently driven by a complexity of motives. 
 
                                                
40 As individuals were allowed to give more than one possible motive for their participation, these percentages 
signify the proportion of individuals who gave that answer.  They do not signify any particular answer as a 
proportion of all possible answers.   
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Refuting racism and ethnic prejudice  
To what extent can popular participation in genocidal violence be explained by longstanding 
and overt racism or ethnic prejudice that Hutu had for Tutsi? 41  Behind this proposition is the 
idea that the Hutu killed the Tutsi because they finally had the chance to do so, having always 
hated them.  I would argue against longstanding racism and ethnic prejudice being seen as the 
basis of popular participation in an anti-Tutsi campaign.  
 
Starting from a definition that a racist has an inherent sense of superiority, I find that Hutu 
from the North and South of the country did not meet this criterion.   Hutu respondents were 
asked whether it had ever been possible for a Hutu to change his/her ethnicity and become 
Tutsi.  Those who answered affirmatively were then asked why a Hutu would want to do so.  
The most popular response was that they had either become wealthier or acquired more cows 
(superior economic status, 47%), while the second most popular answer was that they sought 
the prestige or honour of being Tutsi (social status, 17%).  Interestingly, half of those who 
spoke of social status also equated this with having more cows or more wealth generally.  
However, it was unclear whether respondents felt that this ability to change ethnicity only 
existed under the Tutsi monarchy: that is to say, it was a historical sense of inferiority; or 
whether it still existed as a contemporary sense of inferiority.   
 
 Before Habyarimana’s death in April 1994, Hutu and Tutsi were less integrated in the North 
than in the South.  Not only were there fewer Tutsi living in the North as a whole, but there 
were proportionately fewer inter-ethnic marriages too.  In the South, 21% and 12% of the 
Tutsi population in the Maraba and Shyanda cells had married Hutu, compared with only 3% 
and 0% in the Nkuli and Kinigi cells respectively.42  This statistic becomes even more telling 
when one considers that the relative number of Tutsi living in the northern Nkuli cell (7.6%) 
was higher than in the southern Maraba cell (5.6%).  The absolute number of Tutsi living in 
Nkuli, however, remains lower than in Maraba.  Indeed, when I probed further into the Tutsi 
families in the Kinigi cell, where there were no interethnic marriages at all, I discovered that 
of the two distinct, unrelated Tutsi families resident, all the marriageable members had gone 
to other sectors, and in one case had gone as far as Gisenyi, a neighbouring prefecture, to find 
Tutsi partners. 
 
In addition to looking at ethnic preferences expressed in individual behaviour when choosing 
marriage partners, I also asked a series of questions designed to gauge opinions and attitudes.   
The results again suggest a lower level of ethnic prejudice in the South than in the North.  I 
first asked a question intended to measure perceived ethnic inequality.  Respondents were 
asked whether the Tutsi in their communities generally had more land or more cows than their 
Hutu neighbours.  The data revealed that, in both the North and the South, Hutu respondents 
felt that this was the case.  However, when asked the follow-up question intended to measure 
the legitimacy of this Tutsi success, the consensus was different.  More Hutu in the North than 
in the South perceived this advantage as a result of special treatment the Tutsi had received 
historically rather than as a result of their own hard work.  In other words, Hutu in the North 
were more likely to feel aggrieved by perceived Tutsi socio-economic superiority.  In 
contrast, one Hutu respondent in the South recognised that while some Tutsi in their 
                                                
41 One of the best cases made for the importance of longstanding racism in the genocide is made by P. Uvin, 
Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998, p. 31 
42 It is interesting to note that the majority (76%) of these marriages were between Hutu men and Tutsi women, 
and more rarely between Tutsi men and Hutu women. 
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communities did have more cows than the Hutu, this was customary and did not confer upon 
the Tutsi a superior socio-economic status in his opinion.43 
 
Ethnic distrust also increased as a result of the war in 1990, particularly in the North, and to a 
lesser extent in the South, as a result of the rise in the extremist ‘Power’ factions within the 
opposition parties in 1993.  In the North the suspicion of the ‘enemy within’ was very 
pronounced.  Hutu suspected Tutsi, particularly educated Tutsi at the beginning, of 
collaboration with the RPF.  In my interviews I came across a variety of suspicions.  They 
were accused of knowing in advance that the invasion was planned, of providing intelligence 
to the RPF, of sending their sons to join the RPF ranks, and even of stockpiling guns to use 
against the Hutu.  These suspicions were shared by the state authorities and the villagers, and 
as a result Tutsi were arrested, harassed, intimidated and murdered by villagers working in 
tandem with state authorities in the years leading up to the genocide.  Distrust was therefore 
deep and prevalent in the North, and Tutsi were targeted without proof of complicity.  Such 
indiscriminate targeting and distrust, I argue, is further proof of ethnic prejudice in the North.   
 
In contrast, while the war did cause Hutu to ‘begin to look at Tutsi with a bad eye’ (batanjiye 
kureba abatutsi nabi), it was not a suspicion that was very strong or very widely held in the 
South.   It was mostly confined to a few extremists.  This difference in ethnic distrust between 
the North and South is confirmed by the interethnic marriage rates during the war.  I found 
that they declined in the North but were maintained in the South.  Between October 1990 and 
July 1994, only two interethnic marriages were recorded in Nkuli commune, whereas between 
January 1986 and September 1990 there were 7.44  This was at a time in which the Hutu-Hutu 
marriage rate increased substantially.  Thus in the North, inter-ethnic marriage rates did 
decline during the war, confirming the rise in inter-ethnic distrust.  In contrast, however, I 
discovered that three mixed marriages had been contracted in the war years in the Shyanda 
cell alone, and one as late as 1993, suggesting that distrust was much weaker in the South.     
 
To verify this inference of the differential impact of the war on inter-ethnic relations in the 
North and South, I also asked when respondents thought relations began to deteriorate 
between Hutu and Tutsi.  In the North, 54% of the respondents thought it was when the war 
began in 1990 compared with only 22% of respondents in the South.  In contrast, only 38% of 
respondents in the North thought that relations were good up until the genocide began in 1994 
compared with 56% in the South.  Finally 18% of Hutu respondents from the South attributed 
the deterioration in interethnic relations to the advent of multipartyism compared with only 
5% from the north.  When I eliminated Hutu respondents and sampled only genocide 
survivors these results were corroborated,45 though there was a slight increase in the 
proportion of respondents in the South who attributed the decline of inter-ethnic relations to 
the start of multipartyism in 1991.  
 
Interviews provide additional confirmation of this interpretation of the state of inter-ethnic 
relations before Habyarimana’s death.  Besides the obvious difference that Tutsi were killed 
in the North but not in the South in the war period, there was also the testimony from 
genocide survivors that confirms this difference in prejudice levels.  In the Maraba cell, a 
                                                
43 Interview with inmate formerly resident in the Shyanda cell, Butare central prison, Rwanda, May 2003.  Note 
that although he believes ownership of cows does not confer superior socio-economic status, this does not 
exclude the possibility that this confers superior social status.  
44 All these interethnic marriages were between Hutu men and Tutsi women. Nkuli communal registers. 
45 Genocide survivors include respondents of Tutsi origin and Hutu women who were married to Tutsi men that 
were killed during the genocide.   
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baptism of a Tutsi child took place on 10 April 1994 to which both Tutsi and Hutu were 
invited, even though only four days had elapsed since the death of Habyarimana.  In Shyanda, 
one genocide survivor described relations in her cell as this: 
At the start of the war, all people were afraid – not just the Hutu but also the Tutsi 
as they heard there was war.  There were, however, no problems between Hutu 
and Tutsi as a result in my cell.  Nothing bad was said about Tutsi at the time, 
though perhaps they said it in their huts.  After the political parties started there 
was one person who was strong here and every time he saw me he would pull my 
nose and say he wished he could shave it.  There was no-one else in [the Shyanda 
cell] like this man [E.K.] I don’t think there were others who disliked the Tutsi. 
Perhaps in their huts they said things but he was the only to reveal it to me.46 
 
In contrast, in the Kinigi cell a survivor spoke of her days in school under Habyarimana’s 
regime (before the war started), when she would not linger after classes as she would be 
teased and hounded by Hutu students because she was Tutsi.  As these anecdotes suggest, 
prejudicial feelings were much more overt and pronounced in the North than in the South, 
even before the war started in 1990.   
 
In summary, racism, when defined as a sense of inherent superiority, was contradicted by the 
presence of a historical sense of Hutu inferiority.  However, we do see ethnic prejudice, 
though this was more overt and longstanding in the North than in the South, dating from at 
least October 1990 when the war broke out and possibly earlier.  While there was also some 
ethnic distrust in the South (possibly due to the rise of extremist factions in opposition 
political parties) it did not resemble the profound suspicion in the North that drove the state 
authorities and villagers to arrest, chase and kill the Tutsi there.  Given these differences 
between the two regions, and that genocidal violence was to occur in both places, it would be 
difficult to maintain the view then that longstanding or overt ethnic prejudice was thus a 
necessary condition for mass mobilisation.  This point is subtly underlined when one 
considers that among the 111 perpetrators counted in the South, five of them had been 
married to Tutsi wives before the genocide.  Clearly, then, not all killers were established 
racists or chauvinists.  Having argued against a racist and chauvinist mindset, in the next part 
I argue that the mindset that did prevail was an historical-ideological one instead.   
 
 
Collective historical memory and the ideology of war 
For the State’s call to arms to resonate with Hutu, I argue that there must first have been a set 
of popular beliefs, or mindset, in place: a set of ideological beliefs, instilled relatively recently 
from above through State institutions and the extremist media in the context of an external 
threat, the ongoing war; and a set of historical beliefs, a collective Hutu historical memory, 
embedded from an early age from below through the school system and through the family.  It 
was the fusion of these two sets of beliefs that formed the Hutu mindset at the time of 
Habyarimana’s assassination in April 1994, and allowed the progressive but rapid co-optation 
of the population into the anti-Tutsi programme.  
 
1. Collective historical memory 
Prior to the genocide, the dominant discourse amongst Hutu, and to a lesser degree Tutsi, was 
one of ethnic solidarity and collaboration in the South.  Hutu and Tutsi were good friends, 
                                                
46 Interview, Shyanda cell, Butare, Rwanda, May 2003. 
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shared local beer, and married each other; and this opinion seems to have been borne out 
objectively in the inter-ethnic marriage rates in the South.  However, perceived ethnic 
differences reappear when looking at collective historical memory, and it is in the past that we 
encounter a divergence of opinion between Hutu and Tutsi, but a remarkable unity of opinion 
between Hutu of the North and South.   
 
Hutu historical beliefs, in both North and South, were shared across generations, including 
among those too young to have direct knowledge of these historical events, as well as across 
the prison and non-prison populations.  Overwhelmingly Hutu respondents believed that Tutsi 
were treated more favourably under monarchic rule by the mwami (75%)47, and also under 
colonial rule by the Belgians (68%).48  Similarly the quasi-feudal relationship of ubuhake 
prevalent during the reign of the Tutsi monarchy was remembered as an oppression forced 
upon the Hutu (85%).49  Tutsi were generally remembered as being at the top of the social 
hierarchy, usually the shebuja (patron or master), while the Hutu was the mugaragu (vassal or 
servant) (85%).  It is widely believed that Hutu received unjustified and cruel punishment 
from the Tutsi in the form of the ingoyi, the whip.  Similarly, it emerged that there was a 
widespread shared view of the socio-historical origins of the three ethnic groups: the Twa 
were the indigenous hunter-gatherers, the Hutu were farmers, and the Tutsi were cattle-
herders.  However, in the survey about half of the respondents were unwilling to answer the 
controversial question about where exactly Hutu and Tutsi originated from.  Of those who 
were willing, 27% claimed the Hutu were indigenous to Rwanda and 50% claimed the Hutu 
came from Chad but arrived before the Tutsi.  Of these same individuals, 92%, however, 
believed that the Tutsi came from outside of Rwanda and 62% specified Abysinnia/Ethiopia 
as their country of origin.  Perhaps the most sensitive question I asked was about the Hutu 
memory of the events of 1959, the year of the Hutu revolution in which the Tutsi monarchy 
was disempowered and the first Hutu Republic inaugurated.  All respondents were aware of 
what transpired.  However, when asked whether the revolution was a good or bad event, only 
38% were willing to call it good, while 55% called it bad.  Part of this discrepancy lies in the 
problem of self-censorship under a Tutsi-dominant regime.  However, part of it is explained 
by the follow-up question of ‘Why was it bad?’ – 22% of these individuals thought that it bad 
because it was the origin of the ethnic conflict today between Hutu and Tutsi.  In other words, 
the genocide and its consequences had influenced their opinion of the revolution.  Of those 
individuals who described it as a good event, the overwhelming majority thought it was so 
because it brought Hutu freedom from Tutsi oppression.    
 
So a clear picture of ethnic grievance emerges from the collective Hutu memory.  Hutu were 
seen as having been oppressed, discriminated against, and the victims of injustices under the 
Tutsi.  Moreover, the Tutsi were seen as indubitably foreigners to the Hutu.  This was an 
important mytho-historical belief that the first Republic had instilled, and the extremist media 
reinforced before the genocide.50  In their minds, the Tutsi did not belong to Rwanda.   
Interestingly this memory is specific to the Hutu, and is not shared by the Tutsi respondents, 
who overwhelmingly gave the opposite answers to these same questions.  This underlines the 
relative importance of the family and ethnic community in the formation of such beliefs, as 
                                                
47 The traditional Tutsi king. 
48 Note that these percentages become even higher (82% and 88% respectively) when we discount those Hutu 
who chose not to answer or claimed not to know – unsurprising given the climate of the current regime. 
49 92% if we do not include those who did not answer or claimed they did not know.   
50 One of the most famous examples is the speech of Leon Mugesera, the extremist advocate of the Parti Liberal 
in November 1992 in which he urged Hutu to send the Tutsi back to Ethiopia where they came from but this 
time through the Nyabarongo river (that flows northwards).   
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both Hutu and Tutsi attended the same schools under the first and second Republics, in which 
the history of Hutu oppression was taught.  However, the role of the school system should not 
be underestimated.  Respondents from Butare and Ruhengeri who were in primary schools 
during Kayibanda’s first republic (1959-1973) reported that teachers asked Tutsi children first 
starting school to stand up to distinguish them from their Hutu friends.  Those who did not 
know their ethnicity were told to go home and ask their parents.  Hence ethnic consciousness 
was instilled from a very early age, typically less than ten-years old according to the survey.  
The history of Rwanda continued to be taught in terms of Tutsi suppression of Hutu under 
Habyarimana’s regime (1973-1994).  One young Hutu man, now serving in the gacaca 
committee for the Maraba cell, was a primary school student in the early 1980s: 
They taught us that the Tutsi lived better than the Hutu and that the Tutsi had 
come to colonise them.  They said that the Tutsi had many cows and that for a 
Hutu to get one cow he had to look after their cows for many years.  So we grew 
up thinking that the Hutu were oppressed.51 
 
Similarly, in the North a Tutsi survivor from the Kinigi cell described her school days also 
under Habyarimana in this way: 
When I was in school they taught the history of Rwanda and this might have 
caused suspicions among the students.  They taught that the Tutsi were ruling with 
an iron hand.  The students would then tease me because I was Tutsi.  After 
classes you had to hide to avoid being teased or beaten.  You would not linger in 
case they got hungry and you would rush straight home.52 
 
How can this collective Hutu memory of grievance, present in both the North and South of 
the country, be reconciled with the earlier observation that southern Hutu had low levels of 
prejudice against the Tutsi in their communities?  Part of the discrepancy can be explained by 
the difference that often exists between how one perceives individuals personally known, and 
perceptions one has of the wider category or group to which they belong.  The Tutsi in these 
southern cells were indeed on friendly terms with their Hutu neighbours, but on another 
mytho-historical level Hutu were also the aggrieved victims and the Tutsi their age-old 
oppressors. This is best illustrated in the discrepancy between the answers to two similar 
questions in the survey.   A lower percentage of Hutu in the South felt that the Tutsi in their 
cell (47%) had received special treatment compared with a higher percentage who felt the 
Tutsi in general (73%) had been favoured by the mwami.  Thus the individual-individual 
relationship is perceived differently to the inter-group relationship.  Part of the discrepancy 
also lies in the relative importance we assign to behavioural outcomes over cognitive 
processes.  By this reasoning, simply having the memory of being wronged does not make a 
person racist or prejudiced until the moment the person acts in some discriminatory way 
towards members of this group.53 In the South we do not encounter any overt form of Hutu 
discrimination against Tutsi, certainly not before the war broke out in 1990 and probably up 
until Habyarimana’s death in 1994.54  
 
                                                
51 Interview with gacaca committee member, Tare cell, Butare, April 2003 
52 Interview with Tutsi survivor, Kinigi cell, Ruhengeri, June 2003 
53 For a discussion of how political scientists engaged in explaining ethnic violence tend to ignore cognitive 
processes while psychologists are preoccupied with the measurement of attitudes and beliefs without testing their 
effect on real world situations, see Green & Seher, ‘What is the Role of Prejudice in Ethnic Conflict?’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 6 (2003), pp.509-531. 
54  Confirmed by Tutsi survivors from those communities.   
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2. The Ideology of War and Justification 
The messages contained in State and other extremist media in the years leading up to the 
genocide have been well documented and analysed by scholars, and do not need to be 
repeated here.55  However, what is missing from the scholarship is a sense of the extent to 
which these messages were internalised by their intended audience.  What exactly did Hutu 
remember and believe of what they were being told?  I argue there were two fundamental and 
widespread messages that did take root among Hutu because they resonated with the 
collective historical beliefs embedded from much earlier on: firstly, that this was an ethnic 
war; and secondly, that this war, if lost, would reverse the gains, ‘les acquis’, of the 1959 
Hutu revolution.  An external threat was needed, that could be defined in these ethnic and 
historical terms and thereby activate these latent mytho-historical beliefs in the Hutu 
population.   
 
Respondents were asked whether they thought the enemy during the war years was just the 
RPF or all Tutsi, including those inside the country.  Seventy-one percent of all Hutu 
respondents, with no significant difference between the North and the South, affirmed that 
they thought all Tutsi were the enemy compared with 28% who thought it was the RPF only.   
Respondents from the North were also asked what the war refugees from other regions were 
saying when they reached their communities.56 Fifty-one percent of Hutu respondents 
answered that they were told that the RPF was killing and committing atrocities specifically 
against Hutu; and an additional 9% described it as a war between Hutu and Tutsi.  That this 
was an ethnic war was a very strong belief in the minds of the Hutu population surveyed.   
 
Respondents were also asked what they thought would happen if the RPF won the war.   
Forty-seven percent of Hutu respondents from the North and South believed that the RPF and 
Tutsi would kill or exact vengeance on the Hutu specifically, and an additional 24% believed 
either that the Tutsi monarchy would be reinstated or Hutu would be oppressed and 
disfavoured again.  Here, again, we have evidence that it was perceived as a war of Hutu 
against Tutsi, but also evidence of the belief in a link between the 1959 revolution and the 
current war.  Specifically, they feared that the political and economic gains of the 1959 Hutu 
revolution would be lost.  The Tutsi would be on top again, and the Hutu returned to their pre-
revolution position as the servile and oppressed majority.  One interviewee in Shyanda 
expressed the fear that the land forfeited by the Tutsi exiles in 1959 would be taken back as 
well as “the air that people breathed”.57    
 
Did people think that what they were doing was right during the genocide?  When asked 
whether they felt that other people thought their actions were justified during the genocide, 
86% of Hutu respondents in the North who replied answered that people felt justified, 
compared with 65% in the South.  The results were broadly similar when broken down by 
whether the respondent was in prison or not.  The regional difference might be explained by 
the North’s proximity to the frontlines of the war, and it would be reasonable to surmise that 
                                                
55 One of the best analyses of the Rwandan media before and during the genocide can be found in J.-P. Chrétien, 
J.-P. Rwanda : les médias du génocide, Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1995. 
56 This question was developed in the North after I had administered the survey in the South.  However, when I 
returned to the South to ask this and other questions, I received a letter from the Rwandan government advising 
me that my research was no longer authorised, as it was ethnically divisive. I would like to point out to others 
considering research in Rwanda the danger that their research may place local research assistants in if their 
research project falls foul of the administration’s sensitivities. 
57 Interview, former member of the cell committee, Shyanda cell, Butare, Rwanda, May 2003. 
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ideological messages about the war would resonate more strongly with inhabitants there.  In 
general, though, the majority of Hutu clearly thought that their compatriots felt justified in 
their actions during the genocide.  I then asked those respondents who answered affirmatively 
why these people thought themselves justified.  A slightly stronger ideological mindset in the 
North was again confirmed by these results.  The most popular answer in the North was that 
they thought that the Tutsi was the enemy (40%), compared with only 18% in the South.  In 
contrast, the most popular answer in the South was that it was the law or that the authorities 
had ordered it (25%), compared with only 4% in the North.  The answer on which both 
northern and southern Hutu seemed strongest and closest to each other was that it was 
because the authorities did not stop or punish them for their actions (18% and 29% 
respectively).  In other words Hutu in the North had a bias towards justifying the genocide in 
terms of fighting the wartime enemy, while Hutu in the South had a bias to justifying it in 
terms of the legitimacy conferred by the State’s order to kill, and both groups felt that 
impunity was an important factor.   
 
This ideology was indeed a justificatory one for the Hutu I interviewed.   However, I believe 
it was not only to justify their particular degree of participation to third parties like myself, or 
even to themselves ex-post.  It was also needed to justify it to themselves ex-ante, at the 
trigger moment for the anti-Tutsi programme.  Indeed it was also needed during the 
degeneration into genocidal violence, even though at that point they may really have been 
acting under an amalgam of forces, such as conformity or habituation or opportunism, as 
described earlier.  Self-acceptable answers to the questions of ‘why should I do this?’ and 
‘why am I doing this?’ were needed as much as for the question ‘why did I do this?’  Their 
own interpretation of the anti-Tutsi actions they acquiesced to and participated in was 
necessary at a cognitive level to justify and also drive their behaviour.  The ideological 
messages that were being hammered from above provided ready-made, acceptable 
justifications that more importantly sounded right when laid on top of their own collective 
historical memory of grievance.  
  
 
Counting the victims and killers 
When one looks at the data that the gacaca process has revealed for the four cells, at first 
glance they seem to fall far short of mass mobilisation.   In the southern cells of Shyanda and 
Maraba the percentages of adult men who stood accused were 16.8% and 24% respectively.  
Counter-intuitively, given the higher level of ethnic prejudice in Ruhengeri, in the northern 
cells of Nkuli and Kinigi the percentages were even lower at 4.6% and 0.8% respectively.  
The reason for the regional difference in participation rates is relatively straightforward.   
Most of the Tutsi had fled the Kinigi cell in 1991 before the killing had reached genocidal 
proportions.  There was no one left to kill in 1994.  In the Nkuli cell, much of the killing was 
also said to be done by FAR soldiers based in the adjacent military camp.  This interpretation 
is supported by the data that show that while only 9 individuals from the cell itself stood 
accused, 24 individuals from areas outside the Nkuli cell were credited with crimes 
committed within the cell.   
 
Nonetheless, the bigger puzzle remains concerning how one explains the still relatively low 
proportion of perpetrators in all four communities.  The problem is mainly definitional.  The 
overwhelming majority of the prison inmates whom I personally interviewed, as well as those 
others for whom I collected information on their criminal charges, were accused of either 
actually killing/wounding or being present at that time (that is as a member of ibitero).  
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However, as I described earlier, there were many activities other than participation in attack 
groups that were part of the anti-Tutsi programme of action.   We saw in both the northern 
and southern cells that Tutsi attempts to flee their communities were thwarted by the general 
population.  In Nkuli, Tutsi who fled were captured and returned to the conseiller.   Tutsi who 
were in hiding in others’ homes were denounced.  In addition to this popular surveillance 
there was the considerable verbal abuse of Tutsi after Habyarimana was killed, as the RPF 
was widely believed to be behind his assassination.  In Shyanda more than 100 people 
participated in the burial of a Tutsi family.  However, participation in any of these acts did not 
make one a criminal accomplice in the interpretation of the 1996 Rwanda Genocide Law.  
None of the perpetrators in my sample were accused of committing such relatively minor acts.   
The gacaca judges’ training manual, which explained among other things what kinds of 
behaviour are criminalised under the Genocide Law, was silent on the definition of what 
constitutes an accomplice.58  Yet these acts of complicity occurred on a wide scale, and do 
indicate a broader, but ultimately unquantifiable, level of involvement or mobilisation of the 
population.  In this sense it is possible to speak of the active participation of a sizeable part of 
the population.    
 
The data on victims also need explaining.  Having selected the communities on the basis of 
the proportion of victims killed in situ, I found that these numbers were the result of 
idiosyncratic factors, and that as a ‘dependent variable’ they did not provide a meaningful 
contrast from which to infer possible determinants of popular participation.  For example, in 
the Shyanda cell, the last to descend into genocide and where political activity and ethnic 
prejudice were relatively low, I counter-intuitively found had one of the highest proportions 
of Tutsi killed (56.9%).  It was precisely because it was the last cell to receive the signal from 
above that so many Tutsi were killed in situ.  The delay in mobilisation meant that the 
populations of the surrounding cells had already begun to patrol the perimeters of their 
communities making it impossible for the Tutsi to flee.   Conversely, in Maraba very few 
Tutsi were killed in situ (8.3%), as the warning signals of an impending threat were clear.  
Due to its proximity to the border with Gikongoro, where the attacks had already started, the 
fleeing Tutsi passed through the Maraba community pursued by their attackers, alerting the 
Tutsi of Maraba.  These then fled their homes and congregated at the Parish of Simbi where 
most of them (60.7%) were massacred.  In both Shyanda and Maraba, then, the number of 
Tutsi killed was largely the accident of geography:  Shyanda’s distance from the communal 
authorities and Maraba’s proximity to the border of Gikongoro.  
 
Finally, I should point out that not all the victims were Tutsi and not all the perpetrators were 
Hutu.  Firstly, in the Maraba cell I discovered that 2 out of the 7 residents killed within the 
community were in fact Hutu women who were not married to Tutsi husbands.  One was 
perceived as the local madwoman who had insulted a group manning a roadblock that then 
pursued and killed her.  The second woman, allegedly, was killed by her stepbrothers in 
relation to a land dispute.  Thus I have a very small amount of evidence for personal score-
settling occurring under the cover of the genocide.  Secondly, regarding perpetrators, in the 
Shyanda cell I discovered one Tutsi adolescent among the 48 persons accused of violent 
crime there, and in the Maraba cell 7 Twa from among 63 accused by other inmates.59  Both 
                                                
58 The manual follows the broad principle of the 1996 Genocide law that crimes against the person fall into 
categories I-III, while crimes against property fall into category IV.  All the perpetrators I counted fall into 
categories I-III.   
59 These individuals have been accused by their fellow inmates but have not confessed to these crimes 
themselves.  From among the 7 Twa, 2 still reside in the community, 1 is dead, and 4 are in prison.  The Tutsi 
adolescent continues to reside in the community and has also not confessed to his crimes.    
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of these stories provide a very small amount of evidence that there was a multiplicity of 
motives, other than simply Hutu racism or the State’s coercive power, behind participation in 
the genocide.   
 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued for an interaction of top-down and bottom-up factors in explaining mass 
mobilisation.  Each was a necessary but insufficient condition.  First, the authority of the State 
had to be committed to initially trigger and legitimise an anti-Tutsi programme of action in 
each community.  There were local variations in how and when this commitment was reached 
and in how it was then implemented.  These variations were a function of the differential 
impact of war and multi-party politics on the authority of the State and inter-ethnic relations 
in the years leading up to 1994 in each of these communities.   However, for the involvement 
of the population, more was needed than simply an order or signal from above.  Second, the 
population needed a particular mindset.  I have argued this comprised of part-historical and 
part-ideological beliefs that allowed them to accept and participate in the anti-Tutsi 
programme.  Once the programme was triggered, however, it degenerated through a complex 
interaction of forces independent of the State’s power and authority into genocidal violence. 
 
In making this argument I reject the pure statist, elitist position that the genocide was 
organised at the top and simply implemented locally.60  This argument assumes an 
unquestioning obedience to superior authority that I did not find.  There was already activity 
afoot at the grassroots level that interacted with this order from above.  In the North it was 
deep ethnic prejudice, reinforced by the war, which facilitated the co-optation of the 
population into anti-Tutsi violence.  In the South, it was the gap in the State’s authority at the 
micro-level that allowed the pro-violence elements to come to the fore.  However, I have not 
rejected the statist argument entirely, as I have argued that its authority was needed to initially 
legitimise these pro-violence elements from below before mass mobilisation was possible.   
 
I have also rejected the purely instrumentalist argument of ethnicity.  I do not accept that Hutu 
were simply manipulated into hating and fearing Tutsi by a media campaign of extremist 
rhetoric from above. For these messages to ring true I have argued that there had first to be a 
collective Hutu memory, deeply embedded, of historical, essentialist differences.  However, 
this Hutu memory is not a racist or prejudicial one.  I do not accept that Hutu were 
longstanding racists or ethnic chauvinists.  Hutu and Tutsi could peacefully cohabit with these 
different collective memories, as the years of inter-marriage in the South confirm.   
 
I have also argued, perhaps more intuitively than scientifically as I rely heavily on anecdotal 
evidence, that there are psychosocial explanations for what happened once the signal from 
above was given.  The forces at work here cannot be explained simply by concepts such as 
prejudice and authority alone.  They have something to do with group psychology and bear 
further investigation. 
 
However, having argued this case I nonetheless feel that the units of analysis must be 
multiplied to different parts of Rwanda, in order to identify in a more systematic way the 
different means by which the state and population both came round to genocide.  We need a 
more robust model of the genocide.  One particularly opaque area that has yet to be properly 
understood is what happened precisely after the signal for violence was given.  What I loosely 
                                                
60 The best example of this view is Des Forges et al. (1999), p.8.   
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termed a complex interaction of individual motives that degenerated into genocidal violence 
needs to be deconstructed.  This will require more evidence and different methodologies.  I 
believe scholars from subfields of psychology would be best placed to conduct fieldwork and 
use their research techniques to understand better both individual and collective thinking at 
this relatively un-researched stage of the genocide.       
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Appendix 1: Summary of Selected Results for 4 Communities 
Butare  (southern Rwanda) Ruhengeri (northern Rwanda)  Maraba cell Shyanda cell Kinigi cell Nkuli cell 
Demographics 
Total population (Hutu, Tutsi, 
Twa) 1497 803 969 785 
Total resident Tutsi population 84 (5.6%) 72 (9.0%) 35 (3.6%) 60 (7.6%) 
 
Victims 
Total number of resident Tutsi 
killed 58  61
61 (84.7%) 8 (23%)  53 (88.3%) 
Total number of Tutsi resident 
and killed within the cell 7 (8.3%) 41  (56.9%) 1 (2.8%)  
 46 (77%)  
Total number of Tutsi resident 
but killed oustide of the cell  51 (60.7%)  20
62 (27.8%) 7 (20%)  7 (11.7%)  
Total number of Tutsi from 
outside cell killed within cell 10 9
63  4 0 
Total number of Tutsi 
survivors 26  11
64 (15.3%) 27 (77.1%) 7 (11.7%) 
Total number of Hutu killed 
(not by RPF) 2 0 0 0 
 
Perpetrators 
Number of perpetrators 
accused of committing crimes 
in categories I-III65 by prison 
gacaca 
63 (16.8%)66 48 (24%) 2 (0.8%) 9 (4.6.%) 
Number of perpetrators 
accused of committing crimes 
in categories I-III by hill 
gacaca 
Unknown Unknown 1 (0.4%) 11 (5.6%) 
Total number of people in 
cats. I-III from outside cell 
who committed crimes within 
cell 
Unknown Unknown 19 24 
 
Genocide dynamics 
Number of days between 
Habyarimana’s death and the 
day the first person killed 
13 18 
Attacks started in 
1991.  There were no 
Tutsi left in the 
Kinigi cell in April 
1994 
1 day, but attacks on 
Bagogwe Tutsi 
started as early as 
1992 and continued 
in 1993 
Genocide trigger(s) 
Visit from the 
President of the 
Republic to Simbi 
parish where Tutsi 
gathered 
Raid led by assistant 
burgomasters in 
neighbouring cells 
Not applicable. No 
Tutsi resident in 
April 1994.   
Habyarimana’s 
death.  Conseiller 
and soldiers mobilise 
immediately 
Main leadership figure(s)  Ex-FAR who was Racist butcher in the Not applicable. No Conseiller and 
                                                
61 This is the prison gacaca figure.  The hill gacaca figure was 59 victims. 
62 This is the prison gacaca figure.  The hill gacaca figure 18 victims. 
63 This is the hill gacaca figure.  The prison gacaca figure is 7. 
64 This includes the 6 Tutsi wives of Hutu men. 
65 The 1996 Rwandan Genocide law established four categories of crime.  For the purposes of this table I have 
placed together all the individuals who committed crimes against the person (categories I-III) to distinguish them 
from perpetrators of merely property crimes (category IV). 
66 The percentage is expressed as a proportion of adult Hutu male.  To obtain the number of adult Hutu males in 
each community, I had to assume that it was one quarter of the community’s overall population.   
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during the genocide at the 
cell/sector level 
also MDR 
representative at the 
communal level  
cell Tutsi resident in 
April 1994.   
businessman who 
was also Vice-
president of CDR at 
the Prefectural level.  
Aided by FAR 
Captain of the 
military camp 
Present situation of main 
leadership figure (s) 
Imprisoned (though 
release pending as of 
July 2003) 
Dead Not applicable 
Conseiller 
imprisoned.  Also 
CDR leader believed 
to be in D.R.C. 
Date of RPF arrival in 
community July 4
th 1994 July 2nd 1994 April 7th 1994 July 15th 1994 
 
State Authorities 
Ethnicity of Responsable Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu 
Responsable accused of 
genocide-related crimes Yes No No No 
Present situation of 
responsable Imprisoned 
Dead (natural 
causes) At liberty in cell Dead (natural causes) 
Conseiller accused of 
genocide-related crimes 
Contradictory 
evidence 
Contradictory 
evidence  No Yes 
Ethnicity of conseiller Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu 
Present situation of conseiller At liberty.  Believed to be in DRC. Dead (suicide) At liberty in Kinigi Imprisoned 
Burgomaster accused of 
genocide-related crimes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity of burgomaster Hutu Hutu Hutu Hutu 
 
Ethnic cohesion 
Interethnic marriages before 
genocide:  Tutsi husband. 7 1 0 
0 
 
Interethnic marriages before 
genocide:  Tutsi wife 11 6 0 
2 (but unknown 
when they married) 
Interethnic marriages continue 
after the war begins in October 
1990? 
Yes Yes No 
Unknown for cell but 
for commune as 
whole there is a 
decline 
State-led anti-Tutsi activities 
before Habyarimana’s death? No No Yes Yes 
 
Multipartyism 
Most popular political party 
before death of Habyarimana MRND and MDR MRND and PSD MRND 
MRND 
and CDR 
Political party associated with 
the enemy PL and PSD PSD MDR MDR 
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